Limitations of Writing and Speeches

One of the things Professor Bobonich mentioned in his lecture on Tuesday was how Phaedrus is a critique of writing and speeches. Plato brings up through Socrates’ discussions all the limitations of written words and set speeches. One of his main complaints is that the written word says the same thing every time. (275D) It may appear to be alive when you first read it, and it has the appearance of speaking to you, but if you ask it any question, it can’t respond. Just like a broken record, it will only say the exact same thing over and over again. No elaboration, no specification. Similarly, the written word also cannot distinguish to whom it is speaking. (275E) It could be speaking to someone who knows nothing about the subject, or to someone who is a professional in that field. Either way, it has no way of adjusting or tailoring the presentation to fit the audience. These same criticisms also apply to speeches, which involve no interaction, but are simply monologues. All in all, the written word “is incapable of either defending or helping itself.” (275E5)

If this is Plato’s view on writing and speeches, then why did he write so much? Plato was quite prolific in his publications, and we are still reading his ideas thousands of years later. Clearly, he is not around to help clarify, defend, or rationalize his points. Did he mean for his works and theories to be so well-known? Or did he not expect this to happen, and would he think we can’t truly understand his arguments without proper interaction and discussion? Similarly, in the Phaedrus, there are three rather long-winded speeches. Socrates obviously expects his ideas to be considered, but does he expect them to go unquestioned? Especially since he has two contradicting speeches that clearly cannot both be believed. Are these speeches subject to the same criticisms? If so, why did Plato have speeches in his stories, instead of the more interactive dialogues?

Socrates Critique of Lysias’ Speech in the Phaedrus

In his response to Phaedrus’ reading of Lysias’ speech, Socrates immediately asserts that the speech should be praised for its rhetorical, rather than logical features, or “not so much the invention as the arrangement” (236a3-4). This appraisal is meant to accord little actual praise to Lysias, who clearly favors form to content, consistent with his career as rhetorician. Socrates critiques the repetitive nature of the speech, which obscures the actual paucity of ideas on the topic of love put forward by Lysias. Socrates, by comparison, prizes argumentative or logical expression above rhetorical structures. His criticism, meanwhile, suggests a more general disapproval of creative, formal activity: he refers to Lysias as a “creator” (234e6), which shares the Greek etymology for the word “poet.” As we know from lecture, Plato holds art (poetry, painting) in suspicion, as an activity removed from truth, a position elaborated in the Republic. Moreover, art seems to be associated with the irrational, sensory activity critiqued by Socrates in his first speech, his response to Lysias.

Why, then, does Socrates preface this response with the disclaimer that the ideas are not his own? The strategy is typical of Socrates, who often claims that he knows nothing; and it is apt, in this case, as it allows him to absolve himself of the very act of creation – he is not “creating,” in other words, his theories on love (and rhetoric), but merely reiterating the ideas of others. Meanwhile, how are we to interpret his suggestion that his ideas may have derived from “poets” or “prose-writers”? Does this not contradict his typically low regard of poets? This preliminary act of deferral may suggest that the ensuing speech is not to be taken seriously by the reader: Socrates does, after all, deliver the speech with his head covered, and later provides an alternative standpoint in his “palinode,” or speech in praise of love. Still, this reference to poets and prose-writers suggests an underlying ambiguity and ambivalence on the issues of art and creativity in the text. As Rowe points out, in his commentary to the translation (note 45), the unidentified “prose-writer” in question may well be Plato himself. The reference may be an ironic one, but it may also demand the reader to reevaluate the assessment of art in the text. While he does, in this first speech, seem to associate art with irrational desires, is it not possible that art serve a higher, more laudatory purpose, even guiding its audience to the good, via reason? Socrates’ “palinode” may provide an answer to this last question, in its suggestion of “divine” forms of “madness.” These are important topics to bear in mind as we continue in our reading and analysis of the Phaedrus, particularly as we approach Socrates’ later, culminating statements on speech and writing.

Welcome to the blog for "Word and Image," Section 8!